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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post conviction 
relief after an evidentiary hearing which raised an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim concerning her attorney's conflict of interest due to concurrent 
representation with the co-defendant. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts are succinctly described in the substitute unpublished opinion 
issued in the direct appeal, State v. Barnes, Docket No. 37995 (Ct.App. 
5/4/2012): 
Following a report of concerns that Barnes and her boyfriend, Gregory 
Klundt, 1 were manufacturing methamphetamine in their shared 
residence, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search their house. 
The search revealed a number of items associated with the 
manufacture of methamphetamine. The state charged Barnes with 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine by manufacture, I.C. §§ 37-
2732B(a)(3) and 18-204; trafficking in methamphetamine by 
manufacture, I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(3) and 18-204; and possession of a 
controlled substance, pseudoephedrine, with intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). After trial, a jury found 
Barnes guilty. Barnes was sentenced to concurrent determinate terms 
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of five years for each count. Barnes appeals. 
[Footnotes] 
1 Klundt was also charged with the same crimes. The district court 
joined Barnes's and Klundt's cases for trial. However, the cases 
were not consolidated on appeal. 
2 Barnes was also found guilty of manufacture of a controlled 
substance where a child is present, I.C. § 37-2737A, and was 
sentenced to a consecutive indeterminate two-year term. However, 
she does not challenge this judgment of conviction or sentence on 
appeal. 
Id. p. 2. 
1 
While the Court of Appeals initially vacated the conviction on Count Three 
due to a double jeopardy violation, upon rehearing it affirmed all of the 
convictions and sentences. (R. p. 100.) 
Ms. Barnes also filed the instant pro se petition for post conviction relief. 
(R. p. 5-9.) Counsel was appointed. (R. p. 11.) Counsel ultimately filed an 
amended petition for post conviction relief and affidavit of Petitioner in support. 
(R. p. 19-23, 24-27.) The state filed an answer and a motion for summary 
disposition as to some, but not all of the claims and conceded some needed to 
be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. (R. p. 28-29; 39-40.) Following a hearing 
in which the Petitioner withdrew some claims, the court entered its order 
dismissing them but setting the rest for evidentiary hearing. (R. p. 42.) 
At the end of the evidentiary hearing the court set a briefing schedule and 
Petitioner and the Respondent both submitted post-trial briefs. (R. p. 45-90; 91-
98.) 
The court issued its written order denying post conviction relief. (R. p. 99-
112.) A written judgment was entered. (R. p. 113.) 
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 115.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it denied post conviction relief after an 
evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's assertion that she had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest arising from her 
attorney's concurrent representation of a co-defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION BECAUSE PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY WAS 
BURDENED BY A CONFLICT OF INTEREST DUE TO HIS CONCURRENT 
REPRESENTATION OF A CO-DEFENDANT 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v. 
State, 132 Idaho 722, 979 P.2d 124 (Ct.App. 1999): 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Follinus 
v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
I.C. § 19-4907 (stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil 
proceedings are available to the parties in a postconviction relief 
case). Once the district court has denied or granted the post 
conviction application following a hearing, the evidence must be 
viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings. Reynolds v. 
State, 126 Idaho 24, 28,878 P.2d 198,202 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. 
State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal, 
findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 
794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent 
and substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be 
disturbed. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642, 
644 (Ct. App. 1995). However, this Court freely reviews the legal 
conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts found. Id. 
Id. at p. 724-725. 
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B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Rulings 
The background of the claims is explained in the court's Opinion and 
Order Re: Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter Opinion): 
In the underlying criminal case Barnes was initially represented by 
John Redal. Redal also represented the co-defendant, Gregory 
Klundt. The joint representation continued through the motion to 
suppress which was made on behalf of both defendants and which 
was denied. Following the decision on the motion to suppress 
Redal withdrew as Barnes' attorney and Michael Palmer was 
appointed to represent her. Palmer substituted in as counsel for 
Barnes on May 7, 2010. The joint trial of both defendants began on 
May 25, 2010. One of the issues at trial concerned the results of 
the prosecution's re-testing of evidence by the state drug laboratory 
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with the results provided to Barnes' attorney just days prior to the 
trial. 
Opinion p. 2. (R. p. 100.) 
Petitioner alleged various claims arising from the above situation. The 
most important claim, and the only one pursued in this appeal, is ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to the conflict of interest arising from counsel 
representing both co-defendants through the majority of the case. This led to 
additional problems, because counsel's late advice of his conflict of interest 
caused Petitioner to obtain appointed counsel just weeks before the jury trial. 
This in turn led to appointed counsel being unprepared for the trial (which he 
conceded at the evidentiary hearing) and his specific failings included his failure 
to have the inconsistent lab results retested, his failure to interview and call 
requested witnesses, and his failure to move to sever the co-defendants' trials. 
But again, Appellant is only pursuing the main conflict of interest claim in this 
appeal. 
Petitioner's post trial brief did a good job of explaining the relevant 
evidence was produced at the evidentiary hearing . 
. . . Ms. Barnes testified that she and her codefendant, Greg Klundt, 
were charged with the same crimes encompassing the same basic 
underlying criminal conduct; drug trafficking in methamphetamine 
or amphetamine by manufacture, controlled substance 
manufacture, deliver or posses when children are present, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine, and drug trafficking in methamphetamine. The 
manufacturing and trafficking offenses carried with them a 
mandatory minimum period of imprisonment of five years. Ms. 
Barnes testified that John Redal represented her and her co-
defendant until May 4, 2010, when Mr. Redal withdrew as attorney 
of record. Ms. Barnes indicated that Mr. Redal met with her and her 
co-defendant but never discussed the possibility of testifying 
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against her co-defendant, or presenting evidence of limited 
culpability based on a defense implicating her co-defendant as the 
principal. Mr. Redal failed to alert the Court to a potential conflict of 
interest in Ms. Barnes' case and the Court did not inquire about the 
conflict of interest between the two jointly represented co-
defendants. 
Rather, as testified to by Mr. Redal, he withdrew as counsel mere 
weeks before trial when he determined that the case was bound for 
trial and representation of both co-defendants would be 
problematic. Mr. Michael Palmer testified that he was appointed on 
May 7, 2010, and likely did not obtain information relating to the 
case until days later. Trial was set for May 25, 2010. Ms. Barnes 
testified that she only met with Mr. Palmer once before the pre-trial 
conference on May 21, 2010, and at that fifteen minute meeting Mr. 
Palmer had not had an opportunity to review the discovery in the 
case and was unable to discuss with Ms. Barnes the state's 
evidence. Ms. Barnes testified that she met with Mr. Palmer the day 
before the pretrial conference on May 21, 2010 and then just 
moments before the her [sic] trial began on May 25, 2010. Ms. 
Barnes indicated that at she had requested Mr. Palmer to seek a 
continuance at the pretrial conference but was told the prosecutor 
was ready so the case was going to proceed. Ms. Barnes gave Mr. 
Palmer and Mr. Redal the names of potential witnesses but there is 
no indication that Mr. Palmer or Mr. Redal made any effort to 
investigate or interview her witnesses. Ms. Barnes testified that Mr. 
Palmer never went over the state's evidence with her, specifically, 
the photos taken of the inside of her home and used as evidence at 
trial, nor did he discuss her trial rights. Mr. Palmer testified that the 
state disclosed, the day before trial, lab results which were positive 
for the presence of methamphetamine where previously the results 
had been negative. Mr. Palmer did not seek independent testing of 
the substances given the conflicting laboratory results, nor did he 
seek a continuance of the trial due to the late disclosure of the 
laboratory results. 
Mr. Palmer did not meet with any of Ms. Barnes' witnesses, did not 
use the assistance of an investigator, did not attempt to have 
independent testing of substances, and inadequately educated 
himself on the manufacturing methamphetamine process in order to 
intelligently and effectively cross examine the state's expert 
witnesses. Furthermore, Mr. Palmer did not move to have the case 
severed for trial. Mr. Palmer testified that proceeding to trial with 
Ms. Barnes' codefendant was error, and prejudiced Ms. Barnes' 
ability to present a defense. 
Brief in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, p. 5-7. (R. p. 49-51.) 
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Additionally, the court's Opinion described the relevant evidence 
presented as follows: 
At the post-conviction trial Redal testified that he was retained by 
Klundt and Barnes in 2009. He did not recall whether he initially 
discussed potential conflicts of interest with them. It was his usual 
practice to do so, but he could not specifically recall doing so in this 
case. When it became apparent that the cases were going to trial 
he discussed the conflict of interest with Barnes, and she elected to 
have the Kootenai County Public Defender's office represent her. 
Palmer was then appointed. 
Attorney Anne Taylor testified she believes it is a conflict of interest 
to represent two individuals charged with the same crimes, that she 
would have moved to sever the trial of the co-defendants and if, as 
was the case here, the state had evidence of inconsistent 
laboratory drug tests she would have advised the client and 
requested a continuance of the trial. 
Palmer testified that based on his late entry into the case he did not 
have time to prepare for trial and that when he became aware the 
state had inconsistent laboratory drug tests he should have 
requested a continuance and sought an independent drug test. He 
testified he did not know why he did not do so in this case. He 
testified it was his usual practice to request a severance of trials for 
co-defendants, and he could not recall why he did not do so here. 
Barnes testified she met with Redal only three times, and the 
substance of the case against her was not discussed. Redal never 
discussed the possibility of her testifying against Klundt. Redal 
never told her there was a conflict of interest until after the decision 
on the motion to suppress, and she then applied for the public 
defender to represent her. She met with Palmer on May 10 or May 
11 and again prior to trial. She testified that trial strategy and 
witnesses were not discussed .... 
Opinion p. 3-4. (R. p. 101-102.) 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court found as follows: 
Barnes contends she is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. This 
is not a case where there has been a complete denial of counsel at 
a critical stage of trial. The record shows that Redal, at the 
suppression hearing, and Palmer, at trial, subjected the 
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. Competent 
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counsel could, and did, provide effective assistance. The claim 
based on presumptive prejudice is denied. 
Redal represented Barnes through the suppression hearing. No 
claim has been made that Redal failed to effectively represent her 
at that hearing. The claim against Redal is that his joint 
representation of Klundt and Barnes created a conflict of interest 
prejudicing Barnes. No facts were presented by Barnes to show 
that in connection with the suppression hearing her interests were 
different from those of Klundt or that Redal failed to present facts or 
arguments on her behalf at the suppression hearing. Daugherty v. 
State, 102 Idaho 782,640 P.2d 1183 (1982) held: 
A lawyer or law firm should carefully consider the potential 
for conflict of interest before representing multiple 
defendants in a criminal case. However, representation of 
multiple criminal defendants does not constitute a ''per se" 
violation of the constitutional guaranty of effective assistance 
of counsel. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Roles [v. 
State, 100 Idaho 717,719,604 P.2d 731 (1979)]: 
Absent a showing there was at least a possible 
conflict of interest between the co-defendants at the 
time the joint representation existed which may 
have inhibited the attorney's ability to act for the best 
interests of each codefendant at all times during that 
representation, there is no basis for the defendant's 
claim that his sixth amendment right to effective 
counsel was abridged. 
Id. 102 Idaho at 783-84, 640 P .2d at 1184-85 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Roles v. State, 100 Idaho 717, 604 P.2d 731 (1979) an attorney 
represented co-defendants. Roles alleged on post-conviction relief 
that this constituted a conflict of interest denying him the effective 
assistance of counsel. The Court rejected this contention, holding: 
However, while an actual conflict of interest might have 
occurred if Roles had proceeded to trial with his original 
court appointed counsel, his guilty plea prevented that 
conflict from ever materializing. Joint representation of co-
defendants does not of itself constitute denial of a criminal 
defendant's right to effective counsel. 
Id. at 719, 604 P.2d at 733. 
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Barnes has not shown that "at the time of the joint representation" a 
conflict of interest existed which inhibited Redal's ability to act in her 
best interests. 
Opinion p. 7-9 (R. p. 107-109.) 
C. The Court Erred in Denying Post Conviction Relief 
Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
the petition for post conviction relief which was based on the attorney's conflict of 
interest arising from concurrently representing co-defendants. The relevant law 
as explained by various Idaho cases is described below. First is the explanation 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003): 
The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth 
Amendment as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 
77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932). This right has been accorded 
"not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability 
of the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162,_, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), citing United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 
(1984). It follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in 
preserving fairness does not meet the constitutional mandate. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052 (1984). 
Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a 
particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry. See 
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 101 S. Ct. 
1097 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 64 L. Ed. 2d 
333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). The scope and nature of the 
affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that criminal defendants 
are not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by joint 
representation of conflicting interests is second only to the concern 
as to how strong a showing of conflict must be made before a 
court will conclude that the defendants have been deprived of their 
right to effective assistance. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
475, 483, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978). "In order to 
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who 
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raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 
446 U.S. at 348. However, "until a defendant shows that his 
counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not 
established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective 
assistance." Id. at 350. 
Id. p. 60, 61. 
The relevant law was also discussed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
State v. Koch, 116 Idaho 571 (Ct. App. 1989): 
The multiple defendant issue requires more elaborate discussion. 
Matsuura represented both Koch and a co-defendant. Under the 
Sixth Amendment, an accused has the right to representation free 
from conflicts of interest. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 
S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981 ). Joint representation is 
not a per se violation of this right. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Roles v. 
State, 100 Idaho 717,719,604 P.2d 731, 733 (1979). However, the 
courts have recognized that "a possible conflict [of interest] inheres 
in almost every instance of multiple representation." Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 
(1980) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, a conflict of interest arising from an attorney's 
representation of multiple defendants has been expressly excepted 
from the requirement that actual prejudice be shown. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This exception 
reflects the Supreme Court's holding in Cuyler, that prejudice is 
presumed when defense counsel is burdened by an actual conflict 
of interest. However the narrowness of this exception must be 
emphasized. A presumption of prejudice is triggered only by an 
actual conflict of interest. The conflict itself must be shown; it will 
not be presumed. As stated in Cuyler, prejudice is presumed only if 
the defendant demonstrates that counsel "actively represented 
conflicting interests" and "that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 446 U.S. at 346, 348, 
100 S.Ct. at 1717, 1718. Thus, there is not a double presumption of 
conflict and prejudice in a multiple representation case. McNeeley 
v. State, 111 ldaho200, 722 P.2d 1067 (Ct.App.1986). 
Id. p. 574. 
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The district court's ruling on the conflict issue will be repeated for this 
Court's convenience: 
Redal represented Barnes through the suppression hearing. No 
claim has been made that Redal failed to effectively represent her 
at that hearing. The claim against Redal is that his joint 
representation of Klundt and Barnes created a conflict of interest 
prejudicing Barnes. No facts were presented by Barnes to show 
that in connection with the suppression hearing her interests were 
different from those of Klundt or that Redal failed to present facts or 
arguments on her behalf at the suppression hearing. Daugherty v. 
State, 102 Idaho 782, 640 P.2d 1183 (1982) held: 
A lawyer or law firm should carefully consider the potential 
for conflict of interest before representing multiple 
defendants in a criminal case. However, representation of 
multiple criminal defendants does not constitute a ''per se" 
violation of the constitutional guaranty of effective assistance 
of counsel. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Roles [v. 
State, 100 Idaho 717,719,604 P.2d 731 (1979)]: 
Absent a showing there was at least a possible 
conflict of interest between the co-defendants at the 
time the joint representation existed which may 
have inhibited the attorney's ability to act for the best 
interests of each codefendant at all times during that 
representation, there is no basis for the defendant's 
claim that his sixth amendment right to effective 
counsel was abridged. 
Id. 102 Idaho at 783-84, 640 P .2d at 1184-85 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Roles v. State, 100 Idaho 717,604 P.2d 731 (1979) an attorney 
represented co-defendants. Roles alleged on post-conviction relief 
that this constituted a conflict of interest denying him the effective 
assistance of counsel. The Court rejected this contention, holding: 
However, while an actual conflict of interest might have 
occurred if Roles had proceeded to trial with his original 
court appointed counsel, his guilty plea prevented that 
conflict from ever materializing. Joint representation of co-
defendants does not of itself constitute denial of a criminal 
defendant's right to effective counsel. 
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Id. at 719, 604 P.2d at 733. 
Barnes has not shown that "at the time of the joint representation" a 
conflict of interest existed which inhibited Redal's ability to act in her 
best interests. 
Opinion, p. 7-9. (R. p. 107-109.) 
The court seems to misunderstand the claim. The point is not that the co-
defendants had different interests at the suppression hearing or that Redal failed 
to do something at the suppression hearing due to the conflict. Rather, the point 
is that throughout the joint representation the co-defendants had different 
interests and the attorney's ability to act in the best interest of Ms. Barnes was 
inhibited by the attorney's duties to Mr. Klundt. 
The basic reason for this is there was a different level of culpability 
between the co-defendants (and a different expected punishment). In other 
words, as is so common in drug cases, the boyfriend is the prime mover in the 
offense, and the girlfriend is the follower. This was the case here, as was 
established in both the criminal case and the evidentiary hearing on the post 
conviction. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Palmer testified, albeit in the context of the 
failure to bring a motion to sever, about the relative culpability of the co-
defendants: 
... I believe that the culpability here in this particular case and the 
evidence that I had rested with the codefendant. My client 
happened to sort of just be there riding along. And they lived 
together. They shared the same room together. There was certainly 
evidence that they were doing the same drugs together. But he was 
probably the principal in the manufacturing of it. ... 
Tr. p. 90, In. 24--p. 91, In. 6. 
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Also relevant was Petitioner's minor criminal history. The prosecutor 
established at the evidentiary hearing that Ms. Barnes had only a minor criminal 
history with several misdemeanors, to wit, a DUI in 1994 and a driving without 
privileges in 2005. (Tr. p. 117.) 
Further relevant was the fact that two of the charged offenses carried a 
five year mandatory minimum sentence (and another charge required a two year 
consecutive sentence). (R. p. 49.) 
At the sentencing in the criminal case, the court made basically the same 
findings. 1 At sentencing, the prosecutor requested the shortest amount of fixed 
time possible, 5 years, followed by 5 years indeterminate. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 
362.) The court actually imposed an even shorter sentence. The court 
sentenced Ms. Barnes to 5 years fixed with no indeterminate time on three 
counts to run concurrent (two of which required a mandatory minimum sentence 
of five years), followed by two years indeterminate for a count which was 
required to run consecutive. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 367.) In short, the court imposed 
the shortest sentence that it possibly could given the five year mandatory 
minimum sentence and the two year mandatory consecutive sentence. 
The court explained at sentencing: 
That's somewhat less of a sentence than I imposed upon Mr. 
Klundt. He had certainly a longer prior record and, I suspect, was 
perhaps more intimately involved in the crime than you were. The 
difference in the sentence is not significant, but yours is less than 
what I sentenced him to. 
1 The transcript of the underlying criminal case was admitted at the evidentiary 
hearing. (R. p. 102.) Appellant has contemporaneously herewith requested this 
Court take judicial notice of it. 
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Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 367, Ins. 17-22. 
Some of the court's further reasoning for the sentence imposed included 
that it was Ms. Barnes first serious crime and her prior record was just the 
misdemeanors. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 366.) More significant was the court's 
statement that the facts of the case showed the court that while being guilty of 
the charges, Ms. Barnes was not manufacturing metharnphetamine for sale or 
distribution, it was simply for personal use. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 366.) 
Finally as to the sentencing, as Mr. Palmer argued, had Ms. Barnes just 
gone out and bought the methamphetamine, they would probably be talking 
about a withheld judgment and probation given the quantities and her prior 
record. (Tr., 7/29/2101, p. 362.) 
Given all this, what was in the best interest for Petitioner was for her to 
enter into an early plea bargain in the case which would avoid the 5 year 
mandatory minimum sentence and/or the two year mandatory consecutive 
sentence. Again, the state requested only the mandatory minimum fixed time 
even after a jury trial and the court imposed the shortest possible sentence. 
Given this, as well as the relative culpability of the co-defendants, Petitioner's 
criminal history, and because the manufacturing was for personal use rather 
than for sale, it cannot be seriously believed that the parties could not have 
resolved this case via an early plea bargain that would have resulted in a shorter 
prison sentence. 
But Petitioner's attorney could not advise her to enter into such a plea 
bargain because it would have been directly adverse to the co-defendant he also 
15 
represented.2 Had she pied guilty, Ms. Barnes could have been called to testify 
again Mr. Klundt in the jury trial since she would no longer have a 5th amendment 
right against self incrimination. Even if the state did not desire to proceed with 
live testimony given the boyfriend/girlfriend situation, Mr. Barnes' change of plea 
hearing transcript where she would admit to whatever offense could be admitted 
in Mr. Klundt's trial. This would sink him just as handily without the necessity of 
Petitioner's live testimony. 
In short, in order to adequately represent Mr. Klundt, Redel could not 
advise Ms. Barnes to plead guilty as she should. Thus, Redel actively 
represented conflicting interests and an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his performance and so prejudice is presumed. 
While Redel ultimately recognized his conflict of interest and Ms. Barnes 
obtained her own lawyer mere weeks before the trial date, this did not cure the 
adverse affect of the conflict because by that time the opportunity for an early 
plea bargain was gone. 
To summarize, given the differing culpability and criminal records of the 
two co-defendants, there was an inherent conflict of interest in concurrent 
representation. Given her position in all of this and the presence of charges 
requiring mandatory minimum sentences, Petitioner should have been advised 
to enter into a plea bargain which would have resulted in less prison time, but 
she was represented by the same attorney who also represented the more 
culpable defendant who would be harmed by this course of action. Thus, there 
2 At the evidentiary hearing, neither Redal nor Petitioner testified that plea 
bargains were ever discussed. 
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was an actual conflict which adversely affected Petitioner and so prejudice is 
presumed and her convictions must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's denial of post conviction relief be 
reversed and that Ms. Barnes' convictions be vacated. 
i rh DATED this ~ day of February, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE F SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I / ~Y of February, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing A~LANT'S BRIEF, by the method as 
indicated below: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
17 
() U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
M Hand Delivered to the Attorney 
1"' General's mailbox at the 
Supreme rt 
